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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

HINDSIGHT SERVING FORESIGHT: THE ROLE OF HISTORY IN STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

BY

DR. MICHAEL C. ROBINSON

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

HINDSIGHT SERVING FORESIGHT:

THE ROLE OF HISTORY IN STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

by

Dr. Michael C. Robinson United States Army Civilian

Colonel William T. Vossler
Project Advisor

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ABSTRACT

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The following paper explores the uses of retrospective analyses in the professional development of strategic leaders. Heretofore, the Army and other military services have stressed the employment of historical analysis to gain operational and tactical lessons learned. Even though the Army has a long tradition of drawing upon the past to gain perspectives on current issues, the process has yet to reveal guidelines and theories with respect to strategic thinking. Undoubtedly, history empowers analysis, but most publications of leadership development focus on behavior rather than the cognitive processes of the human mind. New theoretical and practical approaches to the uses of the past are needed to sharpen the decisions of strategic leaders.

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THE VALUE OF HISTORY

Only the study of military history is capable of giving those who have no experience of their own a clear picture of what I have just called the friction of the whole machine.¹

Karl von Clausewitz, Principles of War, 1812

The following discussion offers a reconnaissance and analysis of the past current, and prospective uses of history by military strategic leaders. Perhaps, no profession values history more than the American armed forces. It is emphasized in personal development and the curriculum of the various service schools. A central finding of this paper is that this rich tradition is carried on absent a rigorous understanding of how and why historical analysis strengths strategic decision-making. While positive outcomes can be demonstrated through studying the actions of past leaders, the actual process of cognitive enlargement remains uncertain. Consequently, military officers either study history in a serendipitous and haphazard manner or within the rigid confines of normative classes that focus on campaign case studies, the principles of warfare, and the actions of great leaders. Better understanding of the intellectual processes that make

hindsight relevant to foresight could help shape historical products that more directly meet the specific needs of current and future strategic thinkers.

The wide variety of military history precludes this paper offering overview of its kaleidoscopic forms. The focus of the essay is to examine the status and outlook of military history in the training and education of military (mainly Army) officers.

Special emphasis will be paced on the role of history in shaping strategic leaders and decision-makers as well as methodologies for using the past to serve the future.

Military officers and historians have traditionally proclaimed that the study of past wars, campaigns, and battles enrich the reaching of strategic, operational, and tactical decisions. The lessons of history may be cast in terms of strategic imperatives, the principles of warfare, and even the most specific tactical doctrines. All in all, there seems to be a broad consensus that properly used historical insight fuels decision-making on the battlefield as well as at higher command levels.

The value of history is universally endorsed by the military services. It is embedded in the curricula of service schools and colleges, lavishly employed to enhance unit pride and cohesion, and praised as the intellectual tonic that produces commanders

possessed with nonpareil creative- and critical-thinking abilities.

However, most of the writing on the value of history in military decision-making and leadership development implies that devotion to its utility is almost an act of faith. Military educators and professionals assume history is a "force multiplier," describe how it is artfully used, but rarely offer insights or postulations on why judgment and "visioning" are strengthened by analyzing the past. Yet a critical question remains virtually ignored. What are the psychological and ideational dynamics at work that produce these revered outcomes? Can theories and methods be developed to shape approaches to the study of history that will strengthen decisions by filtering what "lessons" are or are not appropriate for specific situations?

MILITARY HISTORY OVER TIME

If we ignore the historical importance of our profession, the society from which it comes, and why it is worth preserving, we run the risk of the guardians not valuing what they guard.³

General John A. Wickham

A host of military and civilian authors have postulated on why the study of history is central and integral to the training and education of the officer corps. Military history

traditionally has been the principal means of extending learning beyond one's own experience to enlarge the intellectual imagination through the study of others' experiences. This is true whether one seeks insights into command in war, the management of complex organizations, the conduct of campaigns, the refinement and employment of strategic principles and operational doctrine, the special challenges of combined and joint operations, the vexing aspects of logistics and communications, the optimum use of technology, and the dynamics of unit cohesion and spirit.

The study of past conflicts served the pre-World War II Army in many important ways. Battles and campaigns provided an archive of examples that illustrated the successful and unsuccessful applications of established principles and tactical doctrines of war. As these officers engaged in the study of military science, history became the soldier's laboratory. In school and on the battlefield, historical examples could be used to test the validity of tested axioms under a wide variety of circumstances. Drawing upon military history contributed greatly to the professional education of American commanders. History provided the theoretical and pseudo-experimental underpinnings

for practical coursework in tactics, strategy, logistics and other aspects of the soldiers' art.4

Following World War II, the military use of history as a key curriculum element began to sag. As the nuclear era descended on the world, the past seemed peripheral to mutual deterrence.

Noted historian Walter Millis concluded in 1961 "that military history as a specialty has largely lost its function." He suggested that popular military history, including "old tales of war and battles and generalship" would survive. But he doubted that the study of history was of much practicality in a nuclear age: "It is not immediately apparent why the tactics of Nelson, Lee or even Bradley or Montgomery should be taught to young men who are being trained to manage the military colossi of today." 5

In the 1960s and 1970s, military history went into a decline, as the Department of Defense actions seemed to echo Millis' point of view. If large-scale conventional wars were obsolete, why even study World War II since the nuclear stalemate had rendered past operational lessons and principles obsolete? Both the military and government rejected the enduring principle of the past as prologue and rushed headlong into studying the present. Embracing a host of social science disciplines, the critical and systematic study of history was pushed aside by "military-

strategic studies" at senior schools and colleges. This curriculum impulse focused on models and prescriptive outlooks that seemingly offered the military "scientific" forecasts and analyses the era demanded. ⁶

Ironically, the academic approach to military history began to blossom as its relevance to the armed forces declined.

Scholars began to take a wider view of the field and redefined "war history" to include a host of human endeavors. The result was a broad and multi-dimensional scholarly buffet that offered military, social, economic, and political history in inviting combinations. This movement, often called "new military history," vastly increased the number of military historians working in academe. Nonetheless, the vibrant expansion of new methodologies and historiography largely remained an academic endeavor, institutionally divorced from the military profession.

Fortunately, the armed services rediscovered history in the late 1970s. The tragedy of Viet Nam revived interest in the utility of conventional warfare. Thus, history as institutional memory and a source of tactical and operational doctrine once again became central to the education and training of military professionals.

The restoration of history occurred in a cauldron of controversy. A flood of articles and books came forth that discussed the subject of military history, its uses, and role in the education of officers. Senior soldiers were characterized as "historically illiterate" and vocal members of the "military reform movement" alleged that the loss of history was symptomatic of too much emphasis on science and management at the expense of leadership and the art of warfare. Shrill voices within and without the military argued that inattention to history caused a failure to develop strategists, planners, and theorists.8 buttress their arguments, critics concluded that American failure in Viet Nam, the Mayaguez affair, and the botched Iranian rescue attempt were the direct consequences of failing to study warfare. The latter embarrassment, for example, was attributed to planners having been "quite ignorant of the history of commando operations."9

As library shelves began to fill with books that reviewed the Army's failings in Viet Nam, a recurring theme emerged that suggested the entire span of leadership lacked understanding of the nature of war. Fascinated with technology, enamored with systems management theory and practice, and motivated by selfish careerism, the officer corps had loss touch with the strategic

and operational arts. Representative Newt Gingrich argued in 1981 that a revolution in the nation's approach to strategy and doctrine was required to replace its "bureaucratic/administration" Army with a "professional, soldierly one." 10

Trends began to reverse under this harsh glare of criticism, and institutions such as the U.S. Army War College built history back into the curriculum. While no military history electives were in place from 1968 to 1971, eight were offered by 1982. Since that time, history has been an enduring theme of the institution, and retrospective analysis is part of the core and elective curricula. These courses are supplemented by staff rides, invited speakers, oral histories of senior leaders, and applied historical studies conducted by the Strategic Studies Institute that lend perspective to policy-related matters.

Nevertheless, history continues to compete against a host of concerns relating to the training of military officers for the next century. The imperatives of the information age, the focus on futurist visions such as Force XXI and the Army After Next, and emphasis on developing leadership skills within the framework of modern social science, suggest a subtle shift to presentism and a retreat from history. As recently as 1995, then Commandant

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat laid out the competencies required by strategic leaders at the eve of a new millennium. The list included awareness of strategic and operational situations, managing and responding to change, maintaining psychological and physical stamina, and facility with computers. The article makes no mention of history, and even suggests in the opening paragraph that shaping the future is more important than learning from the past. The lack of connectivity between the before and the future is starkly apparent. Even though history remains suffused throughout the curricula, there remains the danger that it will decline in status, diffuse, and become irrelevant. The lessons of the 1960s and 1970s may need to be learned once again.

ANALYTICAL APPROACHES

For it is history, and history alone, which, without involving us in actual danger, will mature our judgment and prepare us to take right views, whatever may be the crisis or the posture of affairs.¹²

Polybius

British historian Michael E. Howard has long explored the use and abuse of military history and developed rules of inquiry that offer guidance to both soldiers and scholars. He first suggests that history should be studied in width -- over a long period of

time. Whereas great insight can be gained by the similarities of the strategies and techniques employed by "great captains," one should also look for the discontinuities that can be discerned by studying the dynamics of change over time

Next, the students of military history should explore their subject in depth. From time to time, single campaigns need to be critically and comprehensively looked at by reading original sources -- memoirs, letters, diaries, and official correspondence. This approach transcends the order imposed on disparate sources by official historians, and reveal the role of intangible factors, such as skill and good luck in addition to planning and courage in determining victory or defeat. 13

Lastly, one must study in <u>context</u>. Howard admonishes that "campaigns and battles are not like games of chess or football matches, conducted in total detachment from their environment according to strictly defined rules." Wars are fundamentally clashes of societies, and they cannot be understood unless one has knowledge of the nations fighting them.

In summary, Howard concludes that by looking at history in width, depth, and context military and civilian students will better understand the nature of war and its part in shaping and being shaped by society. Furthermore, insights gained improve

the military officer's professional competence. Yet the true use of history is not to simply enable the nation's forces to better fight the next war. It is "not to make men clever for next time; it is to make them wise for ever [sic]." 15

Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers, by Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, is perhaps the foremost effort to broadly explore the dynamics of the uses of the past for leaders. The book in some respects is a practical guide for public officials and managers. The authors note, for example, that many senior policy makers in government forego using history to reach decisions because of its analytical complexity, yet readily employ historical anecdotes to advocate intuitively arrived at positions. 16

According to Neustadt and May, history is not just a chronicle of past events but a way of looking back to look ahead. They believe that "thinking in time" has a special significance for military decision-makers because the profession of arms, probably more than any other, focuses on pondering about and planning for the future. If history is to be the handmaid of imagination and prescience, there needs to be some methodology to separate the wheat from the tares.

Most senior Army officers have had some formal introduction to military history though schools and in some cases individual study and mentoring. Unfortunately, such instruction tends to unduly emphasize principles espoused by past masters of strategic military thought, the articulation of hidebound strategic frames of reference such as "centers of gravity," comparing and contrasting the characteristics of the "great captains," and extrapolating strategic and operational lessons learned by studying campaign histories in depth. What is not taught are clear guidelines for using appropriate analogies in a new situation. It is important to distinguish between insight yielding precedents and the inappropriate application of historical anecdotes that may cloud, confuse, or doom the decision-making process.

Also critical is the ability of decision-makers to understand the historical roots of a given circumstance. Initially the senior leader should ask what is the story rather than what is the problem. To this end, time lines are invaluable and need to be extended as far back as possible to capture the causes and consequences of prior events. While the events leading to current challenges may seem of doubtful relevancy, they often offer the best view through the windows of experience. By looking back over time, proposed courses of action can be tested

by hindsight. For example, a general might ask what were the past courses of action, what options were considered, was the decision successful in its implementation, and what alternatives previously considered are more appropriate for current circumstances.

More to the point, history can be employed to help decisionmakers examine their assumptions. Despite objective intentions,
subjectivity is ingrained in nearly all aspects of decisionmaking -- defining the situation, establishing objectives, and
evaluating alternative courses of action. This perhaps is the
apex of the retrospective analytical art. Understanding of
oneself, and the willingness to integrate new features and
discard outmoded ones forms the intellectual foundation of the
flexible, creative strategic leader.

The current generation of military officers tend to concentrate on developing technical, tactical, and analytical skills and use history only for the occasional lessons learned. Thinking in depth over time allows senior leaders to stand back from current crises and place existing circumstances in context. Judgment is clearly sharpened by drawing on the vast fund of institutional and individual experience that historical analysis may provide. The broad tapestry of collected experience enables

the decision-maker to draw upon the strengths and weaknesses of "consultants from the past."

APPLYING HISTORY

That men do not learn very much from the lessons of history is the most important of all the lessons that history has to teach. 17

Aldous Huxley Collected Essays

Viewing history at the more practical level, it becomes apparent that its uses are broad ranging. First and foremost, history can help preclude mistakes by offering a taut rendering of the who, what, where, when, how, and why of past wars and battles. Effective historians and senior leaders can distinguish between myth and reality and enrich the policy- and strategic-making process. For the decision-maker, historical enablers can help develop courses of action that do not rely solely on past assignments, faulty memory, and external or internal advocacy. Fundamentally, the purpose of history is to recreate reality and thereby help the decision-maker ask critical questions as they address a problem. 18

History can also be employed to prevent "reinventing the wheel." The adoption of historical analysis precludes decision-making in a void. Having facts and analysis at hand brings out

nuances that can be rescued from obscurity and applied to current and future issues. It provides a depth of understanding to a problem, a set of issues, or the evidence that can lead to more informed and better choices. This process is not simply avoiding mistakes, but working through the gauzy complexity of facts and issues. Circumscribing history to lessons learned is inane and stultifying. More important is comparing and contrasting past courses of action. What were the conditions, possibilities, and choices available in the past? Finding out what occurred in the past -- how it came about, why, and what was done previously -- illuminates and energizes the imagination and fosters new or contrasting alternatives.

The military history of the United States has exhibited at times stressful tension between the armed forces desire for relevant history and the interests of college professors exhibiting specific research agendas. In addition, the armed forces employ historians that prepare "official" books and articles ranging from annual administrative summaries of specific commands to major books on aspects of prior conflicts. This merging of Clio and Mars has produced contrasting but nevertheless enriching products. It is offered up in a host of forms, including scholarly books, historical fiction, song, epic poetry, and oral traditions.

PATTERNS OF ANALYSIS

Nothing so comforts the military mind as the maxim of a great but dead general. 19

Barbara W. Tuchman The Guns of August, 1962

History has an especial value to the development of strategic leaders. It can assist in avoiding mistakes by offering an accurate rendering of facts and contexts. Armed with perspective, decision-makers can more sharply discriminate between myth and reality. For the policy maker, historical insight can help establish bases of action and analytical agendas that transcend personal experience, inaccurate memory, interestladen advocacy, and false assumptions. The reality of history, despite its shortcomings of incompleteness and even subjectivity, provides a foundation for addressing thorny problems. especially relevant to employ history at the senior levels of the military and civilian workforce because these key decision-makers often change assignments every two to four years. Even though there are a host of individual and institutional benefits to these rotations, the constant turnover predisposes organizational elements to waste vast amounts of time "reinventing the wheel." It is a wise leader who examines issues in depth against a backdrop of what occurred in the past, what and why courses of

action did and did not work and the institutional behaviors and assumptions that led to success or failure.²⁰

Basically, history is valuable because it can prevent policymaking in a void. Armed with perspective on issues and problems,
phased so as to explain how present circumstances evolved bring
to light both the nuances and totality of what is actually
transpiring. Consequently, judgments become more informed and
liberated from self-defeating presentism.

At the tactical level, history offers fairly discrete and precise lessons learned. At the strategic and high operational levels, the study of the past should be more generally applied to develop perspective. Hindsight offers depths of understanding, sets of issues, and institutional memory that help the senior leader make more informed choices. History is after all accumulated experience that adds to the experiential frames of reference the officer or civilian brings to the job.

The very presence of historical mindedness within an organization provides the leadership with a powerful tool for analysis, making it more likely that a sound understanding of the past will be integrated into policy formulation and decision-making. The practice of "applied history" in organizational settings requires the presence of historians and key action

officers that anticipate and understand the needs of leaders.

Mutual ongoing consultation between historians and policy-makers is necessary to insure that the historical products or information are timely, relevant, and in useable forms. To be effective, historians must abandon the normal deliberate pace of scholarly work. Often it is essential to act quickly and produce a product tailored to the strategist or policy-maker. Rather than a lengthy, fully footnoted monograph, the product may be an electronic briefing, a brutally frank point paper, or simply verbal input in the consultative staffing process.

While the uses of history within senior level training curricula is obvious, its employment within high-level military organizations requires a client and collegial relationship between historian and policy-maker that transcends traditional academic or pedagogical frameworks. Military historians have fertile and responsive ground to plow. The study of military subjects has a wide, interested audience that seems to have an insatiable appetite for books, articles, films and various other products. Furthermore, unlike many other historical specialties, there is a strong clientele in the military officer corps that recognizes the uses of the past.

Anne N. Foreman, former Under Secretary of the Air Force, related an anecdote that illuminates why military leaders should

study history. An Israeli general once challenged an historian accordingly: "What makes you think your studies of campaigns in the era of swords, armor, lances, and horses have any relevance to today's fast-paced, high tech warfare?" The historian pointedly replied: "What makes you think, General, that you are smart enough to win the next war on the basis of your own experience alone?"²¹

LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES

...if he who desires to have before his eyes a time picture of the events which have happened, and of the like events which may be expected to happen ... [and others] pronounce what I have written to be useful, then I shall be satisfied. My history is an everlasting possession, not a prize composition which is heard and forgotten.²²

Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War

The foregoing discussion has laid out the uses and relevancy of history at senior decision-making tiers and explored processes that refine and extend the boundaries of analysis. Nevertheless, there are several terra incognitos rarely looked at by the host of writers who reflect on the uses of hindsight. "Applied history" has no firm doctrinal underpinnings, guidelines for making correct choices from the past are subjective as well as anecdotal, and no criteria exist to help leaders decide what

historical products to read, ponder, and apply. In addition, the learning processes at senior military colleges are studded with case study approaches that are frequently constrained by rigid normative frameworks. Future leaders will undoubtedly function in fast-paced, chaotic environments, which offer little time for reflection.

Even more striking is the virtual chasm in the social science literature with respect to how the human mind processes historical information and thereby adds strands of experience to individual cognitive development. What ingredients and processes are at work beneath the surface when the senior decision-maker dives into the vast pool of military historical literature? If indeed history hones and refines the creative thinking and judgment skills of leaders, how does the process enhance the product, what factors are at work that uplift, edify and expand the intellect?

Some pathways of insight may be opened by examining the recent work in the field of human cognition, on the development of military leaders. Thus far the social science disciplines have rarely addressed the mechanisms through which historical perspective helps shape and enlarge the human psyche. In recent years, studies of military leadership have flourished. Borrowing heavily from analyses of leadership in the business world, these

studies tend to focus on what experience and qualities leaders commonly possess that could serve as models for training and development. These deliberations of practitioners and academics often involve the pursuit of common qualities that transcend factors such as upbringing, sex, age, race, environments, and the specific aspects of different historical eras. In addition, considerable attention is given to postulating about whether these qualities are immutable or capable of development in others.²³

This emphasis on analyzing leadership began with the close of the Viet Nam debacle and became more acutely energized by the fast pace of change in the military during the 1990s. Just as in business, military leaders and organizations need to deal comfortably with ambiguity and chaos and develop the ability to reach decisions, lead, and manage in a multi-faceted and ambidextrous manner.

Most authorities on military leadership argue that current and future challenges require leaders with attributes and skills far different from the Pattons, Marshalls, and Bradleys of World War II. The generals who led the Allied victory grew up in and were shaped by a society and Army much different from the forces that are molding and challenging tomorrow's leaders.

For examples, humanitarian, peacekeeping, and a host of other exigencies at the low end of the warfare spectrum require background in foreign area specialties, civil affairs, psychological operations, nation building, and coalition building. The precedents of Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti suggest that United States forces will be called up to adopt a broad spectrum of roles and missions both unilaterally and as part of a multi-national forces that demand sharply honed technical, diplomatic, and political skills. The intimate and harsh glare of the media requires officers to be agile, lucid spokespersons. Constrained resources require military leaders who are willing to sacrifice service priorities to firm up joint war fighting requirements -- to become more "purple."

Leadership scholars, practitioners, and pundits frequently employ case study approaches to fuel analyses on the common behavioral and intellectual conduct of great military leaders. Yet the plethora of books, articles, and other publications remain virtually mute on how the study and application of the past enrich strategic and operational foresight. The elements of effective genius are exposed and tirelessly analyzed, but the dynamics of human cognition are rarely discussed as it relates to leadership. In this field, history is solely used to expose

contrasts and commonalties. The study of the past as it relates to decision-making and leadership remains an orphan.²⁴

Howard Gardner, in Leading Minds: An Anatomy of Leadership, sets a course into these uncharted waters. He suggests that while much has been written on the subject of leadership, a crucial component has been ignored -- the mind of the leader and his or her followers. Linking the study of leadership and creativity, he demonstrates that a strong tie exists between traditional creators (artists and scientists) and leaders in the realms of business, politics, and the military. He has explored the hazards of the unschooled mind and peered deeply into the lives of individuals such as J. Robert Oppenheimer, Margaret Mead, and Mahatma Ghandi to develop what he regards as the six constant features of leadership and the paradoxes that leaders must resolve if they are to be effective. 25 Gardner posits a new line of inquiry that suggests "our understanding of the nature and processes of leadership is most likely to be enhanced as we come to understand better the arena in which leadership necessarily occurs -- namely, the human mind."26 His approach sharply contrasts with the work of behaviorists, who focus on overt actions, and psychoanalysts, whose interests have been directed chiefly at personality and motivation. Cognitive

psychologists examine how ideas develop in the human mind and how they are stored, accessed, combined, rearranged, and conflated by the operations of the human mental machinery. This is a relatively young field that in the future may provide analytical protocols that will make history more applicable to the needs of leaders.²⁷

Current leaders face a cloying variety of historical sources. While traditional forms of retrospective inquiry have demonstrated the value of hindsight to foresight, the research agendas of historians have stressed recreating the past in a host of highly variable respects rather than using the concerns strategic leaders to frame the questions that should be asked of the past. Applied history in the strategic sense is just beginning to emerge within the Army and other elements of the Department of Defense, while academic historians rarely write to the specific needs of current and future decision-makers. Maintaining uninhibited and fresh approaches to military history doubtless pays dividends to all students of the field in the long However, as the military functions in a world that is becoming more volatile, complex, and ambiguous, the need for "targeted history" seems apparent. At the organizational level and in the senior colleges the shaping of strategic "military

minds" through history will hopefully survive the current "visioning" fashion and attention to technology that seem to preoccupy the current generation of officers.

CONCLUSIONS

Read over and over again the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus, Turenne, Eugene and Frederick. Make them your models.... With your own genius enlightened by this study, you will reject all maxims opposed to those of these great commanders. 28 Napoleon, Maxims

Since the development of the "new military history," the scope of retrospective inquiry has become wider, deeper, and broader. Current students have a rich historiography to feast upon. However, even though current and prospective strategic leaders have a massive arsenal of sources to arm themselves, guidelines for making and applying choices are virtually non-existent. Historians also need to shape products that are in tune with leaders' needs and expectations. To do this, requires development of protocols that enable both the historian and strategic leader to optimize historical learning and employ the power of hindsight.

The point of departure for raising and enhancing the relevancy of history to strategic leaders requires a better grasp

of the human mind's almost magical ability to store and process information. Until soldiers and historians gain more precise insights into what adds value to the leader's intellectual and judgmental powers, the uses of the past will not reach their potential. Multi-disciplinary work in this field should begin on why hindsight serves foresight not just in anecdotal and behaviorist terms, but with respect to the very constructs and operations of the human mind. This frontier of analysis will hopefully strengthen efforts to develop leaders who are neither ignorant nor prisoners of the past. Expanding the horizons of historical inquiry in this manner will reaffirm Antoine Henri Jomini's enduring observation that "military history, accompanied by sound criticism, is indeed the true art of war." 29

Word Count: 5991

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Robert A. Fitton, <u>Leadership: Quotations from the Military</u> <u>Tradition</u> (Boulder: Westview Press), 170.
- ² There is a vast literature on the uses of history for the military profession. Some pertinent example follow: David A. Charters, Marc Milner, and J.Brent Wilson, eds., Military History and the Military Profession (Westport Praeger Publishers, 1992); Lloyd J. Matthews and Dale E. Brown, The Parameters of War: Military History From the Journal of the U.S. Army War College (Washington: Pergamon -- Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1987); A Guide to the study and use of Military History (Washington D.C.: (Center of Military History, 1979; Carol Reardon, Soldiers and Scholars: The U.S. Army and the Users of Military History (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1990); Paul M. Rabinett, "The Significance of Military History in Military Education," Armor 66 (Sep.-Oct.1957): 17-28; Warren W. Hassler, Jr., "Military History: The Army's Pivotal Study, Military Review 56 (Oct.1976):229-36; Benjamin F. Cooling, III, "Military History for the Military Professional," Parameters 1 (Winter 1972): 28-35; Correlli Barnett, Old Battles and New Defenses: Can We Learn From Military History (New York: Brassey's Defense Publishers, 1986). Additional pertinent sources are cited in the bibliography.

³ Fitton, <u>Military History</u>, 177.

⁴ Reardon, Soldiers and Scholars, 1-8.

⁵ Walter Millis, <u>Military History</u> (Washington D.C.: American Historical Association), 18.

⁶ Charters, Military History, XIV.

⁷ For insights into the "new military history" see John Whiteclay Chambers III, "The New Military History: Myth or Reality?," <u>Journal of Military History</u> 55 (July 1991):395-406; and Peter Paret, "The New Military History," <u>Parameters</u> 21 (Autumn 1991): 10-18.

- 8 David B. Hazen, The Army War College and the Study of Military History (Carlisle:U.S.Army War College, 1982), 1-5.
- 9 Edward N. Luttwak, "A New Arms Race?", Commentary
 70(Sept.1980): 33.
 - 10 Quoted in Hazen, Army War College, 2.
- ¹¹ Richard A. Chilcoat, "The 'Fourth' Army War College," Parameters 25 (Winter 1995-96): 3-17.
- ¹² Jay M. Shafritz, <u>Words On War: Military Ouotations From</u>
 <u>Ancient Times to the Present</u> (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 254.
- ¹³ Michael E. Howard, "The Use and Abuse of Military History," in <u>Causes of Wars and Other Essays</u> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984): 195-197.
 - ¹⁴ Ibid., 196.
 - ¹⁵ Ibid., 197.
- ¹⁶ Richard E. Neustadt, and Ernest R. May, <u>Thinking in Time:</u> <u>The Uses of History for Decision Makers</u> (New York: Free Press, 1986), passim. The following discussions of the Newstadt-May model are based entirely on these sources.
 - 17 Fitton, Military History, 171.
 - 18 Freeman, "Using History," 26-27.
 - 19 Sharfitz, Words on War, 256.
- ²⁰ The discussion of the profiles of applied history is drawn from the author's quarter century of experience in the field of applied history.
 - ²¹ Charters, <u>Military History</u>, xii.
 - ²² Shafritz, <u>Works on War</u>, 252.

²³ See for example: Michael Syrett and Clare Hugg, eds., <u>Frontiers of Leadership: An Essential Reader</u> (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992); Robert L. Taylor, and William E. Rosenback, eds., <u>Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence</u> (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996); and Henry P. Sims, Jr., and Peter Lorenzi, <u>The New Leadership Paradigm: Social Learning and Cognition in Organizations</u>, (Newburg Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1992).

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Howard Gardner, and Emma Laskin, <u>Leading Minds: An Antomy of</u> Leadership, (New York: Basic Books, 1996).

²⁶ Ibid., 15.

²⁷ Howard Gardner, <u>The Minds New Science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution</u>, (New York: Basic Books, 1985) offers a good overview of the field of cognition. Gardner's six constants of leadership include story, audience, organization, embodiment, direct and indirect leadership, and expertise.

²⁸ Fitton, <u>Leadership</u>, 173.

²⁹ Ibid., 172.

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